Aware of how we generalize

 

I wonder whether I can develop sort of a general pattern on the basis of the case studies I presented in my recent updates: « Let’s Netflix a bit », « Brique par brique », and « Dans la tête d’un non-éléphant ». I mean, what I can do, as a social scientist, in a cognitive sequence that starts with finding the key metrics for the situation, in order to discover anything, then unfolds into finding the sources of information on the actual values of those metrics, just to use that information to identify the key resources, the core processes, and the fundamental ethical values of the social pattern studied.

Key metrics are observable, empirical variables, which I can use to assess the situation in a social context. Finding those key metrics and nailing down their actual values is the essence of what can be deemed as ‘economic method’. This is very largely the essential discovery that Adam Smith made: social systems can be observed mathematically, as sets of equations. Thus, the first step in that method I am unfolding in front of myself, and in front of you, my readers, is to find the key numbers in my social environment. How many people are there in my immediate social circle? With how many of them I should interact daily in order to build for myself a position in the local hierarchy?

Yes, I know, it sounds a bit artificial. People don’t intuitively think like this. I know I intuitively don’t think like this. First conclusion: this method I am unfolding is largely made into formalized research, not really the first cognitive reflex in a new social situation. I think that the other branch of the same path, which I have just published in French, in that update entitled « Dans la tête d’un non-éléphant », is a bit more intuitive. It spells: find the key rules of conduct in your social environment, try to nail down their alternative formulations, and find the meta-rules that serve to select the actual rules of conduct among all the available alternatives. In other words, figure out the game which is being played, get the hang of its rules, and then you have better grounds for enquiring about the numbers.

Good, let’s practice. I start exercising with the topic of my current research: renewable energies and my EneFin concept, that quasi-cooperative scheme where small consumers of energy buy, in the form of complex contracts, both energy and capital shares in the local suppliers of that energy. See, for example, that update entitled ‘The Tribal Equilibrium of the Joule’, in order to have a relatively fresh idea of that concept. When I step, as a newcomer, into any local market of energy, how can I identify the basic rules of the game that is being played in the whereabouts?

As it regards energy, the basic game is about how much energy do I need to occupy a given place in the local social hierarchy, and how much do I have to pay for that amount of energy? As you can notice, I do not really care, as a social Robinson Crusoe, about the natural environment. Yes, it sounds and looks primitive and short-sighted. Still, as I am trying to deconstruct honestly the course of social discovery, this is what I observe in my own thinking as for the market of energy: reference to natural environment and its well-being comes only secondarily, after I have put in place my essential bearings in the social reality strictly spoken.

Anyway, in this particular case – the market of energy – the rules of the game I am playing are very much quantitative. They are prices and quantities, essentially, but not exclusively. The contracts habitually practiced in that market come immediately after, or even ex aequo with prices and quantities. Contracts give an idea of the market power that individual market players can really deploy when negotiating the modalities of their mutual transactions.

If I had to present this path of discovery in a teachable form, like ‘Getting to know a local market of energy, in five easy steps’, what would it look like? Lesson #1 would probably start with a general advice: take some statistics about the local market of energy, for example from the website of the International Energy Agency, or from the World Bank, and check how much energy you are likely to consume per your own capita. Yes, that data is in kilograms of oil equivalent or in tons thereof, and your energy bill will be most likely in kilowatt hours, and thus it is useful to remember: 1 kg of oil equivalent = 11,63 kWh. Try to think, how much energy, above the strictly personal use, does a person need, in this particular market, when they want to start a small business, or when they want to turn from an individual into an organisation?

Lesson #2: get to know the prices of energy in your local market. Is there any reliable source of information in this respect, or do you have to sign, first, a contract with the local supplier of energy, and buy some, and receive a bill, in order to know the actual price? The transparency of pricing is an important institutional trait in energy markets, especially as it comes to the relative market power in small users, like households or really small businesses. As – or if – you become informed about the prices of energy, you can calculate the typical budget spent on energy, or simply the average annual energy bill, in typical social actors.

Lesson #3: get to know the typical contracts, in that local market of energy. First of all, is there any source of information about the contents of a typical contract for the supply of energy, or, as it is sometimes, and sadly, the case for the prices of energy, do you have to sign the contract first, and only then you are entitled to receive all those appendixes in small print, which fully explain what you have just signed? Yes, I know some of you can laugh, at this point, but I remember signing my first contract for the supply of electricity, for my first fully owned apartment in Poland, back in 1992. I had to sign a summary form, which essentially stated that I agree to the terms which will be delivered to me in written form once I sign that particular form. Kafka, you say? Yes, happens sometimes.

Anyway, in that lesson #3, the interesting path to follow in your own discovery is to observe the diversity of contracts. I am connecting, here, to my last update in French, entitled « Dans la tête d’un non-éléphant ». In this particular phase of research, it is interesting to discover how many different and clearly distinct contractual patterns are there in the given local market. Is it a ‘mono-contract’ environment, or is there some flexibility? The former suggests a typical market structure from textbooks on microeconomics: monopoly or oligopoly. The latter suggests something more competitive.

Basically, lessons #1 – #3 should tell us what room for institutional innovation is there in this precise market, i.e. what are the odds that a new institutional scheme will work and gain participants.

Good, lesson #4. Once we know the quantities, the prices, and the contracts, it is time to try something practical: a business concept. Not even a fully blown business plan, just a business concept. As you see that local market, can you think of a new, promising business? Logically, what you supply in the market of energy is, well, energy. There is not much room for product innovation in that respect. Still, as you think of it, what we consciously purchase is not the strictly spoken energy, as we do not decide about each individual electron flowing through the plug, but rather the access to energy. You can think about many different forms of that access.

A quick idea, just like that. Imagine a city with many, publicly available charging points for electronic devices. At some of them you can pedal to generate electricity, but just at some. Imagine that you have something like a unique login ID, or codename, which you use to plug your electronics into those publicly available sockets. Every time you use that form of energy outside your household (or the headquarters of your company), the corresponding intake of kilowatt hours charges your account. That would be a market of energy, where consumption is as individualized as technologically possible.

In that lesson #4, you can play with assessing this business concept. What are the odds that it catches on anywhere on Earth? What is the SWOT map, i.e. what are the required competitive strengths, the weaknesses to avoid, as well as opportunities and threats generated by the market?

I have that intuition that you reach the summit of scientific understanding about anything when you can design and control an experiment pertaining to that anything. This is the path to follow in your lesson #5 about the market of energy. Design and control an experiment, related or unrelated to the business concept from lesson #4. How can people experiment with energy? What types of behaviour are important to observe experimentally? How can you achieve, in your experimental environment, the usual attributes of a good experiment: isolation of precise phenomena, acceleration of their occurrence (as compared to real life), observability?

Why do I put experimentation in the last lesson? This is an old principle known to all engineers: if you can experiment with something, and survive, and have some fun, and, on the top of all that, have some new knowledge, it means you’ve got the hang of the thing.

I am taking on another particular, the teaching of management, a teaching I deliver to the 1st year Undergraduate students. If, hypothetically, I try to manage any type of organisational structure, from any hierarchical position that allows any management whatsoever, what are my first steps into an unknown territory? How can I know the rules of the game and which rules are a priority to figure out? Intuitively, I would look for the things that hold the surrounding organisation together. Are those people working together, although, let’s face it, they sometimes hate each other, because they refer and report to a common leader, or rather because they have common goals?

Thus, my lesson #1 in management would consist in observing patterns of behaviour in people around me. What exactly do they do together? How do they cooperate? How do they compete against each other? It is important, in that first lesson, out of the five (allegedly) easy steps, to observe rather than speculate. Just find patterns in human behaviour. The easiest way to do it is sequencing. Any pattern, in any part of observable reality, is a sequence of events. As you observe human behaviour around you, look for recurrent sequences. There are bound to be some. Mr A holds a meeting, every three of four days, with persons B, C, D, and E. The meeting usually lasts about one hour. The person D is usually pissed off, after those meetings.

Another one; when a customer complains about poor quality of the product, those complaints usually trigger a row. Who is arguing with whom?

Lesson #2 means jumping to another source of information: financial statements. Here, a remark. I know many people have a profound disgust of numbers and mathematics, usually because of shitty teaching thereof at the level of elementary school. Still, the outcomes of shitty teaching can be reverted, simply by triggering our own curiosity into action. The financials of an organisation are like the health metrics of a human. If you want to know somebody’s health, you need to understand the meaning of numbers like pulse, body temperature, the average length of sleep time during one night etc. Same thing with financials. They are pertinent metrics of an organism, period.

So, you go to those financials, and you take all of them, like the balance sheet, the income statement, the cash flow statement, and you simply look for the greatest numerical values. You figure out what is sticking out, quite simply. You select the categories attached to those numbers, and you connect them, as if you were connecting the dots in one of those graphical quizzes. This is an almost painfully basic, practical application of the scientific principle known as ‘the Ockham’s razor’. The principle states that the most obvious answer is usually the right one, where the most obvious means the one which requires the least assumptions. In this case, the greatest financial values are supposed to be the most important.

You can also get more sophisticated, during lesson #2, and take financial statements from two distinct periods, in the same organisation. You match the financial categories from two periods, and you calculate the relative magnitude of change, like value from the period T1 (later), divided by the value observed in the same category in period T0 (earlier). If you move along this tangent, you will pay attention to those categories, where the relative magnitude of change x(T1)/x(T0) is the greatest, in plus or in minus.

Lesson #2 teaches you basic empirical observation of quantitative variables, and now, in lesson #3, you are going to combine those empirical observations with the patterned human behaviour from lesson #1. Whatever type of measurement you chose in lesson #2 – the greatest absolute financial values or those displaying the greatest magnitude of change – in lesson #3 you assume that people do things about money. The patterns of behaviour you nailed down in lesson #1, they have a function, and that function is most likely connected to those big, or those quickly changing, financial amounts you observed in lesson #2. In lesson #3, therefore, you are pinning down the actual strategy – or strategies – in the organisation you are studying.

Here, one important distinction is due. The commonly used definitions of strategy, in management science, usually refer to the goals of the organisation, and the tasks planned in order to achieve those goals. Me, in my own little scientific garden, I cultivate the beautiful, behavioural flower of no-bullshit. I deeply agree with Bernard Bosanquet who used to say that it is bloody hard to know for sure what people want, and it is much more sensible to watch what they do. I also cherish John Nash’s point of view, namely that a strategy needs to have reasonably proven payoffs if it is to be seriously used in the future. To me, a strategy is a recurrently repeated pattern of action, with recurrently occurring results. A strategy can be something that people – or organisations – do even without being aware of doing it.

Anyway, in lesson #3, you define those connections between money and behaviour, as the typical strategies in the given organisation. Time has come for lesson #4, the lesson of what-if, the lesson of change. You know what people usually do in an organisation, you know what they are after, in terms of financial payoffs, and now you can imagine what will happen to this organisation if some of those parameters change. For example, what kind of change will this business – if this is a business, of course – undergo if they have the opportunity to attract an extra 40% of equity? (i.e. an addition of equity capital equal to 40% of what they already have as equity; search for the definition of ‘equity’, just to make sure you know what I am talking about). What would happen if they had to cut their equity down by 40%? What kind of strategies would they apply if there is a new opening, in their target market, which allows to pump their gross margin up by 20%, through higher prices? What if a new tax cuts their gross margin down by 20%?

Time for lesson #5, which is of the same kind as lesson #5 about the market of energy: design and control an experiment. Take the organisation you have studied in lessons #1 – #4. You can use the hypothetical changes you traced in lesson #4, or something else that comes to your mind as intriguing, like what-happens-if-I-press-this-button-oops-I-am-sorry but now transform those paths of change into experimental sequences. You give people some input – a task, a piece of information etc. – and you design a detailed sequence of how they should be responding to that input. You design that sequence so as the response, observed in the participants of your experiment, brings you the most valuable information possible.

You know what? I start liking that approach ‘learn Whatever The Hell You Want in 5 Lessons’. I know, I know: liking my own ideas is a slippery path. It is easy to misstep and fall into the abyss of hypocrisy. Still, I like the thing. Those five lessons about the market of energy seem to cover pretty much the basics of Microeconomics, one of my main teaching curriculums, and so, having covered microeconomics and management, I attempt a graceful jump towards another of my teaching paths, that of Political Systems and Economic Policy.

In order to make my jump look more graceful, i.e. in order to mask the possible awkwardness of my movements, I am doing something I like doing: I revert. I like reverting. This time, when teaching something about Political Systems, I will start, in lesson #1, by asking my students to design an experiment. Yes, this time, they start at the point where the students of management would be asked to finish. Let’s take a practical case: the constitution of The United Republic of Tanzania. The one from 1977.

Click this link, download the constitution and ask yourself the following question: how could you possibly stress-test the system? I mean, where can you see the weakest spots in the constitutional order? What sort of phenomena can hypothetically turn this order into disorder, and into what kind of disorder? At this stage, as this is your lesson #1, you can advance pretty intuitively. I am giving an example. In Part II, Article (47), points (1) and (2) of this constitution you can find the following rule: « 47.-(1) There shall be a Vice-President, who shall be the principal assistant to the President in respect of all the matters in the United Republic generally and, in particular shall assist the President in making a follow-up on the day-to-day implementation of Union Matters, perform all duties assigned to him by the President, and perform all duties and functions of the office of President when the President is out of office or out of the country. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 37(5), the Vice-President shall be elected in the same election together with the President, after being nominated by his party at the same time as the Presidential candidate and being voted for together on the same ticket. When the Presidential candidate is elected the Vice-President shall have been elected. »

Now, imagine that for some reasons, the Vice-President has not been elected, or has been elected but he or she has resigned right after having been elected, and there is no one willing to take the office. In short, no Vice-President. What happens to the political system of Tanzania in such a case? Is it like that block of domino, which, once knocked down, drags the entire constitutional order into deep s**t (spell, as usually, s-asterisk-asterisk-t)? Or, maybe it is just a minor inconvenience?

Take another constitution, that of Australia. Do the same scanning as for this particular case. Look for really soft spots in the system: the institutions, political actors, or mutual checks of power between political actors, which, once disabled or out of control, can knock the whole system out of balance. The question is quite important, by the way. The Australians have the tenth Prime Minister appointed, over the last 10 years. This is a lot of change. Some kind of deep imbalance might be at work. Maybe you can put your finger on it?

Time for lesson #2: generalize the experiments from lesson #1. Take the same countries, those from lesson #1, Tanzania and Australia in the occurrence, and try to sketch the alternative avenues their respective political systems could possibly take from the present moment, into the future. Like three alternative paths of change for each country.

Lesson #3: generalize the observable idiosyncrasies from lessons #1 and #2. What structural (i.e. durable) differences can you notice between the two cases, Tanzania and Australia? What sort of difference between them can you pin down, as for the relative solidity of their constitutional orders, as well as regarding their possible paths of change? How would you describe the unique features observable in each of those political systems?

Lesson #4: figure out the rules of the game. If you had to give a piece of advice to your friend, like how to make a political career in Tanzania, what would you recommend? What does it mean to make political career in Tanzania? What are the most likely stages and pit stops? How long could it take to make the career in question? What strategies should your friend use to cover that path?

Move your (imaginary?) friend to Australia and try to repeat the process of designing their career path in politics. How is it different from Tanzania?

Lesson #5: nail down general metrics for political systems. Sum up your experience from lessons #1 – #4. Now, imagine that somebody asks you: ‘What are the most important facts and numbers to look upon if we want to understand how a given political system works? Which stones should we lift and turn in order to discover the fundamental mechanics of a political system?’. Now, I know that you might feel slightly ill at ease at this point. How can I make general rules on the grounds of two case studies? Well, firstly, this is how science works: brick by f***ing brick, you build that house. You observe one thing, you observe another thing, and you draw your conclusions even if you are not aware of drawing them. That whole piece of intellectual gymnastics, in 5 lessons, serves to make you aware of how you generalize.

Besides, as it comes to political systems, you do not have like a huge sample of cases; it is barely 150 more or less observable entities on the entire planet.

I am consistently delivering good, almost new science to my readers, and love doing it, and I am working on crowdfunding this activity of mine. As we talk business plans, I remind you that you can download, from the library of my blog, the business plan I prepared for my semi-scientific project Befund  (and you can access the French version as well). You can also get a free e-copy of my book ‘Capitalism and Political Power’ You can support my research by donating directly, any amount you consider appropriate, to my PayPal account. You can also consider going to my Patreon page and become my patron. If you decide so, I will be grateful for suggesting me two things that Patreon suggests me to suggest you. Firstly, what kind of reward would you expect in exchange of supporting me? Secondly, what kind of phases would you like to see in the development of my research, and of the corresponding educational tools?

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A man walks into a bar, and then comes the calm duke

It’s summertime. Politicians are on holiday, hopefully, at least some of them. That’s a good thing, ‘cause when they come to work, like daily, you need to watch them constantly. You turn your back for a second, just for one second, and they come up with something. They are always up to something, those politicians, and so it is good to know what exactly are they up to.

That paragraph, I mean the one above, is an acceptably shitty attempt at the introductory joke for the study of political systems. I do research about political systems, I write serious books about them, and I lecture about them, and I did some blogging about them as well in the past, and so I think I can do some blogging about them now.

Right, so I go on with shitty jokes. A man walks in to a bar, orders a drink, and starts talking to the barman. The man is new in that particular neighbourhood. Such blokes use to ask stupid questions to barmen. This one is no exception to the rule. He goes: ‘Hi, man. Do you have any political system, here?’. The barman is an experienced on. He knows stupid questions, and he is ready to respond. ‘Yes, we do.’ He answers ‘We have a constitution. It proves we have a political system’. ‘You have a constitution? Wow, nice. But, just tell me, how do you know YOU HAVE a constitution? I mean, I understand that part about the constitution as such, but how do you know it is your constitution and not someone else’s constitution?’.

The atmosphere becomes a little tense. What did you expect, man? You ask a man who is serving you drinks how can he know the constitution he thinks is his is really his own. This is bound to raise some eyebrows. Still, the barman holds his ground. ‘This constitution has a rule, written in it, that it is in force in the territory of our country, for one. Besides, it had been enacted, way back in the days, by our Parliament, for two. It all proves it is our constitution, man. Still, good attempt, bravo.’.

‘Yeah, you’re right. If it says it is in force in your territory, it must come from here and be your own. Stands to reason. Good point. But, tell me’ – the man doesn’t give up easily – ‘isn’t it the constitution itself that defines the territory of your country? I mean, it says it is in force in the territory it says is the national territory, doesn’t it? And the Parliament, it is your Parliament because the constitution says so, and the constitution is supposed to be your constitution because it has been enacted by the Parliament it says is the proper Parliament, right? Bit of a conundrum, here, don’t you think?’.

The barman gives up. ‘Look, man. It is nice chatting with you, but I have other customers to attend. See that doorframe over there, on the right? This is Dead Brains’ Room. Go there and ask for Alex. He will tell you more about political systems’.

‘Alex? Alex what?’

De Toqueville. Just go there and ask. The bloke is a fundamentalist, just like you. You should get along well.’

‘A fundamentalist? Me?’

‘Yes. You like asking fundamental questions. C’mon, man. Just go there and talk to Alex’.

The Dead Brain’s Room is a strange collection of people. All kinds of styles, you would say, as if taken from different epochs and places. After asking around, the fundamentalist man finds a slender gentleman with black hair cut into that interesting, like 19th century fashion, where hair on the sides of the head seem to form half-open wings of a bird ready to take flight. He is Alexis de Toqueville. When asked about political systems, he goes into a strange tirade: ‘Amongst the novel objects that attracted my attention during my stay in the United States, nothing struck me more forcibly than the general equality of conditions. I readily discovered the prodigious influence which this primary fact exercises on the whole course of society, by giving a certain direction to public opinion, and a certain tenor to the laws; by imparting new maxims to the governing powers, and peculiar habits to the governed. I speedily perceived that the influence of this fact extends far beyond the political character and the laws of the country, and that it has no less empire over civil society than over the Government; it creates opinions, engenders sentiments, suggests the ordinary practices of life, and modifies whatever it does not produce. The more I advanced in the study of American society, the more I perceived that the equality of conditions is the fundamental fact from which all others seem to be derived, and the central point at which all my observations constantly terminated’.

The fundamentalist man tries to understand. He asked this de Toqueville guy about political systems, and, as an answer, he heard something about equality, course of society, public opinion, laws, governing powers, habits of the governed, the Government with a capital ‘G’, opinions, and sentiments.

The fundamentalist man asks Alexis de Toqueville a few more questions, just to check the background, and here it comes. Now, it makes more sense. Alexis de Toqueville made a long trip to North America, in 1831. He was supposed to visit prisons there, on the request of the French king. So, the guy went to a country completely different from his own, namely the post-Bonapartist France, and he got hooked. Fascination comes from the experience of difference. He became so fascinated with that society under construction, in the early United States of America, that he made a detailed account of the whole system.

Probably without being aware of what he was doing, de Toqueville did an exemplary study of a political system: he started with a historical sketch, just to show how the whole thing came into being, and then he intuitively focused on those aspects of the aspects of the political order. That historical nerve is probably what I appreciate the most in de Toqueville writing. You can notice, by the way, that I have just let go the joke story about that man who walked into a bar, and I am returning to my basic narrative style. That’s the thing, man: you drag a joke over too long a way, and it stops being funny at all.

Anyway, what I like about de Toqueville is his attachment to history, which is even more noticeable given the fact that history, as a real scientific discipline, needed like 2 or 3 decades more to start emerging in the intellectual landscape of Europe. I appreciate the historical approach because I am strongly attached to the idea that social structures in general, political systems included, are very largely made of habits. It is arguable to what extent those habits last over time. The French historical school is, I think, the best at showing how those habits pile up to the point of becoming dysfunctional, and then the social structure shakes off and starts accumulating new habits.

Societies are like hamsters. Each institution, developing over time in the social system, is like another grain of corn that the hamster, i.e. the government, puts in its cheek-bags. Is the hamster stupid? No, not at all. What is does is a very sensible strategy, but it has its limits. Sensible strategies usually do. The limit is the capacity of the hamster’s cheeks. They are not likely to burst, by the way. If you have ever had a hamster, you could see the incredible capacity of that little animal. It can stuff itself up to an insane volume, with that food stored for later. What comes before bursting is impediment in the hamster’s movements. The more you carry in your cheek-bags, the slower and less agile you are, hence the less able to collect new grains. This has been nicely explained by a German mathematician, Reinhard Selten. He was Nobel Prized in economics, together with John Nash and John Harsanyi, and his specific contribution was the theory of games with imperfect recall (see, for example: Selten 1975[1]; Hammerstein, Selten 1994[2]).

Reinhard Selten studied social games played over long periods of time. The law is one of such games. These games have a special trait: the set of players is being changed without interrupting the game. New players come in, and old players drop out. It has to alter the rules of the game, as new players bring with them a word or two about how the game should be played, or, elegantly, they bring new strategies. Now, we have a paradox. Either the coming of new players with new strategies does not change much to the game, in which case we have a rigid social game with not much adaptability, or the game adapts usefully and the new ones alter it with their ideas, but then, the game is not quite the game it used to be. There is a span of time, that Selten used to call as the span of recollection, over which the rules of the game can accommodate both the old players and the new ones. This span is limited. When the discrepancy in expectations and strategies between players who joined at different times reaches a critical point, some old rules naturally drop off the game. Social games played over long periods of time have imperfect recall, because their rules and equilibriums cannot be unequivocally traced back to the hypothetical beginning of the game.

The funny thing about political hamsters is that they like attributing their heritage to things that don’t exist and have never existed. Take the classical partition of three powers, in a government. The legislative should be separate from the executive, and both of them should be accompanied by an independent judicial power. Most people who know a bit of political theory would immediately trace this distinction back to Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu and his book ‘The Spirit of Laws’. The interesting thing is that when you read that book really carefully, you will not find any mention whatsoever of that principle of division of powers. Montesquieu made a typology of governments, but he did not postulate the division of powers. Who did, then?

Who knows? The separation of the judicial power seems to be of the earliest date, probably due to the progressive emergence of the highly specialized legal profession, century after century. The separation between the executive and the legislative, on the other hand, seems to be an American invention, and to have its roots in the executive offices established in the early British colonies in North America. Read Alexis de Toqueville on that one.

I am getting back to that embarrassing question the fundamentalist man asked to the barman: how can we know we have any political system at all? Is the presence of a constitution a sufficient premise? In general, yes, I agree. Still, there are exceptions. Take Great Britain, for example. Technically, they have a lot of constitutional law without having a written, enacted constitution in the strict sense of the term. I know, I know, there is Magna Charta Libertatum, or The Great Chart of Liberties, from 1215.  I know it feels great to trace the roots of your nation’s constitutional backbone back to the 13th century, but just think of that hamster from the preceding paragraphs. Just how big the cheek-bags of the British political system would have to be in order to carry the institutions collected over more than eight centuries?

Same thing for New Zealand: there is no one, single, compound document called ‘The Constitution of New Zealand’. Still, New Zealand, just as Britain, seems to work quite smoothly, as political systems come. As a matter of fact, I am a huge fan of New Zealand’s political order. They have things, over there, which look really revolutionary, in the positive sense of the term. They have that thing, for example, that the Parliament can vote a budget it has billed like on its own, without any bill from the executive branch.

On the other hand, let’s suppose there is a constitution, but one or more political actors just don’t care, and free ride on the tide of political power. Does it mean there is no political system? Certainly not. If this is not necessarily and strictly speaking the constitution that makes a political system, then what is it? Although the constitutional track is not 100% correct, it gives an insight. Constitution is law, and this law puts order in the intricate network of hierarchies present in the given social structure. Political systems are observable through the lens of laws they enact into force, and through the predictability of behaviour in people who clearly wield power.

Law and predictability of behaviour are connected. Law is made of rules, and, generally, law is law. Still, as you dig deeper, there are two layers in law. In the first place, there is that sort of structural, framework law: the constitution, or, in the absence thereof, the rules regarding the way government should be organized, the civil code, and the criminal one as well, as we talk about codes. You know, that solid stuff that lawyers mean when they tell you in Latin, or almost: ‘Sorry, dude, but ignorantia iuris nocet’ (you get in trouble when you don’t know your law). This layer of law makes the frame of the political system. The presence, and the content, of those laws gives gravitas and predictability to what politicians do.

On the other hand, there are laws oriented on the achievement of a clear purpose, like a plan.  Let’s take a case like from real life. Always embarrassing, to stick close to real life, but always instructive, as well. Recently, Australia has enacted new regulations against espionage, allegedly with the purpose to counter the Chinese interference in the Australian political system. I followed that lead a bit, and I am focusing now on one particular print, namely on the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018 No. 63, 2018. Someone could ask: ‘You are Polish, Mr Wasniewski, so why the hell aren’t you writing about the Polish political system, and instead, you take on those poor Australians?’. Yeah, babe, that’s the thing about writing about political systems. It is frequently safer to write about other countries than about your own. Especially now, in Poland.

Anyway, that second layer of law expresses policies, thus what the political system does. Not all policies are enacted, but many do. It depends on how flexible they are supposed to be, and what about of budgetary money they need. You want a flexible policy that does not necessarily require to divert the stream of taxpayers’ money? You keep it executive, like those presidential proclamations that President Donald Trump uses to impose tariffs on imports. You want to implement a costly policy, which requires fiscal effort, and you don’t really expect to back off in three months from now? In that case you are likely to push some bill through the legislative.

The fundamentalist man enters our bar and asks again: ‘Do you have any political system? How do you know you have any?’. Now, we, the barman, can answer in a little bit more corkscrewed a manner: ‘It depends what kind of political system you fancy, man. If you want something well hinged, sort of regular, with basic legal frame and at least some policies enacted as law, yes, we have plenty. If, on the other hand, you are thinking about something less stringent, rather something sort of like a no-holds-barred game, sorry, we are short of. You can call by that other bar, down the street, with the big « Revolutionary Republic of We Know Better » sign over their door. They should have that second kind on stock, right now. This is probably why you can hear gunshots from there, every now and then’.

All that thinking about political systems made me think of reposting a bit of my writing from last year. It is because I am deeply fascinated with the 17th century in Europe. I have sort of a gut feeling that we are leaving the peaceful world of standardized political systems, which started to build up by the end of the 18th century, and we re-enter the fascinating maze of intertwining social hierarchies of the world, which, fault of a better word, we use to label ‘feudal’. In 1675, the publishing house run by Louis Billaine, located at the Second Pillar of the Grand Salle of the Palace, at Grand Cesar, published, with the privilege of the King, a book entitled, originally, ‘Le Parfait Négociant ou Instruction Générale Pour Ce Qui Regarde Le Commerce’. In English, that would be ‘The Perfect Merchant or General Instructions as Regards Commerce’. The author was Jacques Savary. By the way, the title I provided here above is the abridged one. The full title holds in 13 lines. Master Savary wanted to be precise, and indeed he was. On 829 pages, he covers very comprehensively a lot of practical topics.

I like reading books in a hermeneutic way. It means that I try to deconstruct the context, which the book had been written in. As we are talking 17th century and French monarchy, the most important part of the context could very well be the King, and the king was the Sun King: Louis XIV of France. The second important thing in the context is d’Artagnan. Alexandre Dumas chose to put an end to his hero’s life in 1673, in a battle, identically to the death of the real d’Artagnan, or Charles de Batz de Castelmore d’Artagnan. As we are talking Louis the XIV, we are talking Jean-Baptiste Colbert, the famous minister of finance, and his active, capitalistic policies. We are talking about doing business in an environment strongly marked by the interests of the most powerful people being around. We are talking about the creation of Saint-Gobain, the manufacture of mirrors, today a global business. It was the time, when huge ambitions of the absolutist monarchy went hand in hand with a quick development of really big (I mean bloody big, really) capitalism. There were those first attempts, from the part of the Sun King, of issuing money in order to finance his military prowess. The money in question, later on disdainfully called ‘the Bernardines’, was a failure, but the idea took root (read more in: Sombart 1911 – 2001[3], pages 65 – 70).

So, two years after d’Artagnan’s last battle, and during the reign of the Sun King, Jacques Savary publishes that book about being a perfect merchant, in really mousquetairy an environment. How had he come up with the idea? He states it very frankly in the preface of his book: ‘For although I might have had sufficiently good a name, and sufficiently good a birth, to be employed at some higher profession, I admit that, having been destined for Commerce by my parents, it is the employment, which I occupied myself with for a long time, the care I gave it, the particular cognizance that I took of the most significant and the least things as regards it, the ventures I made with all kinds of Manufactures, the losses that I suffered there, those that I avoided, have given me enough enlightenment and enough experience for ignoring nothing that regards the Negoce’.

I am translating Master Savary’s words the best I can, yet the original is the original. Champagne is a good example. You can get your own PDF of Master Savary’s writing from  www.gallica.bnf.fr , or Bibliothèque nationale de France. Anyway, before I go further in the wording of that preface, I go further hermeneutical with Master Savary. A few interesting things to notice in that first paragraph. ‘Commerce’ and ‘Negoce’ start with capital letters, so I gather it must be something important. Commerce was something slightly different than trade strictly spoken. We are in the world of capitalism based on debt, and more specifically on the bills of exchange. It will take more than an additional century (one and a half, as a matter of fact) to invent the institution of limited liability in a business. Someone could say: in there was no limited liability, it was better to rely on one’s own equity in doing business. Well, yes and no. Yes, because your own equity, contrarily to debt, will not give other people claims on you. No, because if you lose money in a venture, it is, on the whole, better to lose other people’s money than your own. Instead of chipping out of your own possessions, you can borrow money and lend money. The trick, and the art, was to find a balance between lending and borrowing, and it was mostly done with relatively liquid bills of exchange, traded by endorsement.

Those bills of exchange travelled much faster, and changed hands much more frequently than the stocks of goods they were more or less attached to. Commerce was the craft of trading both the goods, and the bills of exchange, at different speeds. Now, comes the subtle shade of Negoce in your Commerce. The merchant called ‘Negociant’ was a really big wholesaler, both in goods and in credit. The Negoce consisted in trading big amounts of goods and capital in a coordinated way. A Negociant could do business for years just by trading credit, without seeing a single barrel of rum or a single sack of corn, or, conversely, he could be an artist in recognizing, for example, good coffee, and making huge deals on it, after sniffing just one handful. A Negociant had to be good in law, in finance, in politics, occasionally in knife fighting, he must have been ready to travel frequently, and to shift elegantly between the crude conditions of an exploration trip and the splendours of Parisian parties. The life of a Negociant was capitalism with its teeth bare and a spark in the eye.

Master Savary says he was well born. He seems suggesting he could afford not to go into Negoce, and yet he did go that way. I guess he must have been the smart guy in the family, but probably not the first in line for inheritance. This is the probable reason why his parents destined him to be a merchant. So he had his teeth cut in doing Commerce, and he must have been really good at it, if, as he writes ‘The cognizance that I had acquired of the practice before being applied to Negoce, stepped from the fact that in the disputes arising ordinarily between Negociants, I endorsed a great number of arbitrages: the advantage I had derived from it is that in the study of evidence, books and personal conduct of those who had recourse to me in their disputes, I made myself sufficiently capable in all the matters the most important and the most difficult in Commerce’. 

Yes, Master Savary must have been really quick on the uptake, and smart enough to conceal his speed of thinking a bit, just enough to appear as a steady, reliable arbiter. One thing that remains unclear in this short curriculum, is the order in time. Did he start as an apprentice with a Negociant and gradually became good at arbitrage? Or, maybe, he started as a lawyer and specialized in commercial arbitrage? I do not know. Anyway, he did not stay in the Negoce for ever. ‘The time came when the Commerce was so weakened and bankruptcies so frequent, that there was no security in playing one’s possessions, I judged then that I will do no bad deed by retiring and embracing another profession. An occasion presented itself, which confirmed me in this decision; for a Minister of His Serenissime Highness Monseigneur the Duke of Mantua came in France, who offered me the intendancy of his business in France and Charlville: which I accepted, and entered in the year 1660 to the service of His Serenissime Highness, in which I still am; […]’.

Right, let’s go hermeneutic once again. ‘Serenissime’ means kind of very calm in his ways. Noble born people, in the past, liked dropping this adjective in those long designations, half-name, half-social status that they used to introduce themselves. It probably meant that they wanted to appear cool and relax. ‘Peace, bro. See that Serenissime on my visit card? It means I am really calm, and I will have you executed only at your second mistake. Want a sniff?’. So, Master Savary went into the service of that Italian duke from Lombardy (this is where Mantua is). Being a duke was a good position. The difference between a duke and a prince is that the former is just the top dog in the feudal hierarchy, and the latter is of royal blood and waiting in line for sitting on the throne. Apparently, especially in Italy, being a prince was really unhealthy an occupation. You could have had those horrible hunting accidents, when a wild boar attacked you with five crossbows, and could even follow you home. Waiting in line for top offices is rough. Being a duke was safer, as you were the boss and it was kind of official and legally guaranteed. You just had to wait a few centuries, over some twelve generations, and you had that dukedom. Well, yes, you had to put your bets on the right prince, the one who didn’t get attacked frequently by wild boars with crossbows, or just had more crossbows secured on his side, together with the properly qualified labour force.

So, Master Savary started somehow (?) in the Commerce, then went into business arbitrage, which made him convinced he is really good at Negoce. He went into Negoce, did some business, earned some money, lost some money, and then decided it was not really calm an occupation. When a very calm (i.e. Serenissime) duke from Italy offered him a job, he accepted willingly. As he sketches the job in question, he says: ‘[…] in order to fulfil my obligations it was necessary for me to study the Ordinances and the Customs, as there was much business decisions based thereon; so as I committed myself to read them, and in that reading I made remarks on everything pertaining to Commerce, which served me usefully in the composition of this book. When His Majesty, willing to put a limit, by a Regulation, to the abuses that were being committed in the Negoce, had it ordered by circulating letters to Judges and Consuls, Guards and Communities of Merchants in the good towns of his kingdom to send him their memoirs on this subject, I believed it was my duty to work individually, too, in order to make my eagerness visible and the desire to serve the King and the public; this is why I composed two memoirs, one containing the abuses that were being committed in the Commerce, which I presented to Monseigneur Colbert at the end of August, 1670, the other was a bill of Regulation, which I composed in several chapters, where I proposed dispositions that I saw as just and proper to put a limit all the abuses I mentioned in the first memoire; I presented this bill to Monseigneur Colbert in the following September’.

Right, I am back into hermeneutics. Have you noticed, how long are the sentences in Master Savary’s writing? That was the style of the time, I guess. It survived until the first half of the 19th century, when shorter sentences became definitely the fashion. Did those people, back in the days, have longer breath? Were they able to put more sound between two full stops? Or, maybe, they just have longer and more structured ideas, which they did not feel like truncating? Who knows, they are no longer here to tell us. Anyway, it appears that Master Savary was not really the perfect merchant he wrote about. He had some adventure in the Negoce, but, on the whole, he did not seem to like it. He was more of a bystander to business, who used to have views on business. He was an economist, just as I am. When I was young, I had serious plans for a legal career. In 1989, in Poland, the Big Swing came, everything fell apart, there was not much I could inherit, and so I went into business just in order to survive in the new reality. Doing business was interesting, only I just wasn’t prepared for it, and after fourteen years I decided, just as Master Savary did, to accept a job from a really calm duke. In my case it was a university. Comes the time, comes the calm duke.

Master Savary was an economist, only he did not know he was. The word ‘economist’ comes from the French ‘économiste’, and this was the label put on the followers of Francois Quesnay, the author of ‘The Economic Table’ (French: ‘Tableau économique’), published in 1758, a few years before Adam Smith published his ‘Enquiry Into The Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations’. The work by Francois Quesnay was probably among the first piece of macroeconomics officially published, together with ‘The Theory of Taxation’ (French: ‘La Théorie de l’Impôt’) by Marquis de Mirabeau. Initially, the term ‘économiste’ was a bit pejorative and meant some loonies obsessed with numbers. Economics, at the time, the time being the verge of the 18th and the 19th centuries, were ‘political economy’. It was only at the end of the 19th century that any scholar could call himself seriously an economist.

I am an economist, which, due to the work of intellectual titans of the past, is no more equivalent to being a looney obsessed with numbers. Science can help, and this is why I do science.

I am consistently delivering good, almost new science to my readers, and love doing it, and I am working on crowdfunding this activity of mine. As we talk business plans, I remind you that you can download, from the library of my blog, the business plan I prepared for my semi-scientific project Befund  (and you can access the French version as well). You can also get a free e-copy of my book ‘Capitalism and Political Power’ You can support my research by donating directly, any amount you consider appropriate, to my PayPal account. You can also consider going to my Patreon page and become my patron. If you decide so, I will be grateful for suggesting me two things that Patreon suggests me to suggest you. Firstly, what kind of reward would you expect in exchange of supporting me? Secondly, what kind of phases would you like to see in the development of my research, and of the corresponding educational tools?

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[1] Selten, Reinhard. “Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games.” International journal of game theory 4.1 (1975): 25-55.

[2] Hammerstein, Peter, and Reinhard Selten. “Game theory and evolutionary biology.” Handbook of game theory with economic applications 2 (1994): 929-993.

[3] Sombart, W., 1911-2001, The Jews and Modern Capitalism, translated by M.Epstein, First published 1911, edition 2001 published by Batoche Books Limtied